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Chapman University School of Law 
Transcription of 2012 Chapman Law 
Review Symposium:  “The  40th  
Anniversary of Watergate:  A 
Commemoration  of  the  Rule  of  Law” 
Panel 1:  “President  Nixon’s  Secret  Tapes:   
Evidence that Politically, Legally and 
Historically Defined Watergate (and 
More)” 
Friday, January 27, 2012 
Moderator: 
John W. Dean* 
 
 * John W. Dean served as Counsel to the President of the United States from July 1970 to April 
1973.  Before becoming White House counsel at age thirty-one, he was the chief minority counsel to the 
Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, an associate director of a law reform 
commission, and an associate deputy attorney general at the U.S. Department of Justice.   
  His undergraduate studies were at Colgate University and the College of Wooster, with majors 
in English Literature and Political Science; followed by a graduate fellowship at American University 
to study government and the presidency.  He then entered Georgetown University Law Center, where 
he received his J.D. with honors in 1965.   
  John recounted his days at the Nixon White House and Watergate in two books: Blind 
Ambition (1976, with new extended afterword in 2010) and Lost Honor (1982).  After retiring from a 
business career as a private investment banker, Mr. Dean returned to writing best-selling books and 
lecturing, as well as becoming a columnist for FindLaw’s  Writ   (from   2000   to   2010).      He   currently  
writes a bi-weekly column for Justia.com. 
  Mr.   Dean’s   other   books   include:   The Rehnquist Choice: The Untold Story of the Nixon 
Appointment that Redefined the Supreme Court (2001), Warren G. Harding (2003), Worse Than 
Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush (2004), Conservatives without Conscience 
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Panelists: 
 
Scott Armstrong** 
Alexander Butterfield*** 
 
 
John Dean: This is really a unique panel this morning.  I take special 
delight in being able to moderate.  I am the guy who thought I was taped; 
Scott is the guy who thought there might be taping; and Alex is the guy 
who knew there was taping.  They have been together once before, almost 
forty years ago when they brought this information to the public, but also, 
realizing the historical importance of what they were doing, they paused to 
make a record of it.  That record, made many years later in the Journal of 
American History, is a fairly detailed account.  What I thought would be 
interesting this morning is to reminisce about these events, where we can 
serve as your fact witnesses.  I thought that since this program is being 
recorded—appropriately—by C-SPAN, that what I would do is adopt my 
favorite  television  questioner’s  approach,  that  of  Brian  Lamb,  and  be  rather  
blunt and right to the point and let the program really evolve around the 
very special guests we have this morning.  So let me start with you Scott, 
and ask, where did you go to school?  That is a very Brian Lamb type of 
question. 
 
(2006), Broken Government: How Republican Rule Destroyed the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial 
Branches (2008), and Pure Goldwater (2009).   
  While working on his next book, Mr. Dean continues as a visiting scholar and lecturer at the 
University   of   Southern   California’s   Annenberg   School   of   Communications (since 2003), and as a 
regular on-air   contributor   to   “Countdown With Keith Olbermann”   on  CurrentTV.     Mr.  Dean   is   also  
engaged in an extended continuing legal education series that examines the impact of the American Bar 
Association’s  Model  Rules  of  Professional Conduct on select historic events, like Watergate. 
 ** After attending the University of California and a distinguished career with the United States 
Air Force, Alexander P. Butterfield took the post of Deputy Assistant to the President in 1968.  In 1972, 
President Nixon appointed Mr. Butterfield as the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration.  
Mr. Butterfield was tangentially drawn into the Watergate scandal after Hugh Sloan mentioned Mr. 
Butterfield  was   in   charge   of   President  Nixon’s   “internal   security.”      In   July   of   1973,  Mr.  Butterfield  
appeared before the Senate Committee and revealed the details of the taping system that President 
Nixon used to monitor his conversations.  The testimony to the Senate Committee served to launch the 
investigation which eventually compelled President Nixon to release the tape recordings.  Mr. 
Butterfield remained administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration under President Gerald Ford 
and resigned from the post in March of 1975. 
 *** Scott Armstrong initially began studying philosophy at Yale University at the age of 17.  As an 
investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee, Mr. Armstrong conducted an interview with 
Alexander Butterfield which led to the investigation and discovery of President Nixon’s  White  House  
taping system.  Soon after, Mr. Armstrong began working as a reporter for The Washington Post, where 
much of his coverage focused on the Watergate scandal.  Mr. Armstrong later founded the National 
Security Archive, a non-profit group that obtains and publishes declassified documents acquired 
through the Freedom of Information Act.  Mr. Armstrong is currently the executive director of the 
Information Trust. 
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Scott Armstrong: Yale University. 
John Dean: Alex, how about you? 
Alex Butterfield: I started at UCLA, and then went into the Air 
Force, and everyone said I would never continue, having dropped out of 
school.  But I did, thanks to the University of Maryland, which was 
worldwide.  I went to the University of Maryland in Munich, and then I 
went to eight other campuses in Europe and in Libya.  I eventually did my 
final semester in Maryland.  That was my undergraduate. 
John Dean: Scott, what did you do when you got out of Yale? 
Scott Armstrong: I went to law school  for  a  brief  time.    I  didn’t  like  
it.  I thought it was an inferior way to catalogue the world, [laughter] a 
second rate epistemology, so I quit.  I got involved in correctional reform—
reform of the criminal justice system.  I was running a program for men 
coming out of prison just before Watergate. 
John Dean: Alex, if I recall, while in the service, at one point you 
were at the Pentagon, and you had dealings as liaison with the Johnson 
White House, so you later went to the Nixon White House with some 
experience in the operations.  Tell us a little about how you got the job for 
the Johnson White House, what you did, and how that might have educated 
you about working in the Nixon White House. 
Alex Butterfield: I’ll  try  to  be  brief.    I  tend not to be.  When I came 
back from Vietnam, I went into the policy division of war plans in Air 
Force headquarters at the Pentagon.  Shortly thereafter, within about six 
months, I was called down by the Director of the Joint Staff, Lieutenant 
General Burchinal, who told me about an opening in the immediate office 
of the Secretary of Defense.  My specific job: I was the military assistant to 
the Secretary of Defense for White House matters.  I was told every time 
the Secretary of Defense went to the White House, I was to go with him, 
even if it meant running alongside his car and jumping in while it was 
moving, you make sure you get over there.  Oftentimes McNamara left 
me—I’m   this   little   Lieutenant   Colonel   that   he   hardly   recognized—but I 
eventually spent at least twenty hours a week in the Johnson White House.  
I was usually there doing some errand for the Secretary, and there is an 
awful lot of interplay between the Defense Department and the White 
House. 
John Dean: So you got to understand some of the basic and broad 
mechanics of how the place operated? 
Alex Butterfield: Yes I did, especially around the Oval Office.  I 
came to know Johnson, and all of his key people. 
John Dean: Scott, long before you got involved in Washington, you 
had a longtime friend who would influence a lot of your life, and you, 
probably, some of his life.  Would you describe to this group who that 
person is, and what that influence was? 
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Scott Armstrong: Well, two years ahead of me in high school in 
Wheaton, Illinois, was a fellow named Bob Woodward.  I was from the 
other  side  of  the  tracks  from  Bob,  and  I  really  wasn’t  focused  on  college, 
and Bob got me interested in the Ivy League, and encouraged me to come 
to Yale where he had gone.  I got married when I was seventeen years old, 
and Bob helped me make that transition because I lived off-campus at Yale.  
Later, when Bob was in the military, I would come to Washington for anti-
war marches.  He was working in the Pentagon, and I would stay with him.  
It was ironic.  Over one evening conversation sometime around the 
beginning of Watergate, I was down in Washington and Woodward was 
telling me about this fellow named John Dean, who was the embodiment of 
evil at this point because he was working on behalf of John Mitchell, and 
was very loyal to Mitchell.  I was told that John Dean had been 
recommended to go to the White House by Mitchell, and Dean was 
working behind the scenes to cover up this thing called Watergate—this 
was right at the beginning—and we had this conversation about loyalty, 
and I said, “Isn’t   it  possible  for  a  person  to  be  loyal  to  something  good?”    
By that point, we determined Mitchell may not be the embodiment of good.  
There was a time before we realized that attorney generals can lie like 
everybody else, and run things out of their office that are inappropriate.  
And so I volunteered   this  notion   that   someday   I’d   like   to   find   somebody  
good to work for in Washington and do something reasonably decent. 
John Dean: Alex, how did you end up at the Nixon White House? 
Alex Butterfield: I was minding my own business in Australia.  I was 
what they call the Senior U.S. Military Officer in Australia.  The 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Theater was John McCain’s   father,  
Admiral McCain. I had just heard that I was going to be given another two 
years there.  Australia is an idyllic assignment, unless you’re ambitious.  
It’s  left  field,  it’s Siberia, you do not want to be there if you are coming up 
for promotion. 
John Dean: Contrary to some revisionist interpretations, you were not 
with the CIA in Australia? 
Alex Butterfield: No.  There were actually twenty-two Defense 
Department activities, which  I  oversaw.    I  didn’t  command  anything,  but  in  
Australia there were about twenty-two Defense Department activities and 
about 600 U.S. troops there.  So I was desperate.  I   didn’t   want   to   do  
another two years there.  I had to get out of there.  We were confined to our 
hotel in New Guinea, it was raining, and I read in the New Guinea Tok 
Talk—which is their newspaper—all about this guy Bob Haldeman, who 
was going to be the Chief of Staff to this new President that had just been 
elected.  Haldeman and I, it was built up that we were close friends.  We 
were not close friends, but we were friends at UCLA because of our 
girlfriends, who were sorority sisters  and  very  good  friends.    I  thought  I’d  
write Bob a letter and mention all of my Washington experience, because 
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this California mafia would be hungry for a guy like me—I was hoping—
who knew how Washington worked. 
John Dean: Tell us also in a summary overview what you would do 
when you arrived at the White House. 
Alex Butterfield: It all worked out with Haldeman, and I was called 
in there, and I thought I was going to have a military job, and I found out at 
the  last  minute  that  I  wasn’t,  so  I  left  the  military.  It was my own choice to 
leave, but I felt that it was tradition if I was going to be in a policy-making 
position that I should leave the military.  Haldeman said, “You and I will 
be the only ones working for the President.    This  man  doesn’t  like  to work 
with a lot of people.  If he likes you, we will be the two guys through 
whom  he  will  work  with  his  staff.”    And  then  he  said, “I  have  to  introduce  
you  at  exactly  the  right  time.”    I  thought  he  meant  later  that  day,  or  maybe  
the next day.  Thirteen days later, he took me in hurriedly and out of breath, 
and  that  was  a  spectacle.    I’ve  never  met  a  stranger  person  in  my  entire  life.    
I’ve  never  met  anyone  who  had  so  much  trouble  meeting  me. 
John Dean: Describe that.  Physically?  Conversationally? 
Alex Butterfield: First  of  all,  it  wasn’t  the  right  time.    Haldeman  was  
waiting for this right time, but he suddenly had to go to California.  He 
came in breathlessly to me and said, “We’ve got to go and see the President 
right now.  We have to introduce you.  I didn’t  want  it  to  happen  this  way.”    
He could see what was coming, knowing Nixon as well as he did.  I 
couldn’t   imagine   what   the   problem   would   be   just   to   say   hello   to   the  
President and tell him how honored I was to be there.  So we rush in sort of 
out of breath.  Nixon gets up from his desk, and Bob said his little piece.  
Then I said how honored I was.  And then the President—I have to stand 
up to tell you this—the President says [a series of guttural sounds], and he 
sort of circled his hand.  It was like charades.      I   couldn’t  believe   that  he  
couldn’t  utter  a  word.    Then  he  started  doing  this  with  his  foot  on  the  rug  
[rubs his foot back and forward on the ground].  I was perfectly at ease 
there for a while, then I noticed I was doing this back and forward on the 
rug [repeats the same motion].  The man never did say a word, just guttural 
sounds and hand circling.  I saw him do it many times later, and I 
understood.  Finally Haldeman just grabbed me and said, “Alex   will   be  
here  tomorrow.” 
John Dean: Scott, what were you doing when Alex was heading 
toward the White House? 
Scott Armstrong: Well, at that point I was still in community-based 
corrections, trying to get people out of prison, trying to shut down major 
institutions.  It was before Watergate, before I got into the business of 
putting members of the community into prisons. 
John Dean: Staying friendly with Woodward in this period? 
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Scott Armstrong: Yeah, and there was literally a time as Watergate 
was breaking open, and we knew it was breaking open because James 
McCord, one of the burglars, who had been the former Chief of Security of 
the CIA, had written a letter to the judge.  As it was breaking open, I got a 
call from Woodward recalling our conversation about being loyal to the 
good, and he said, “You’re   going to get a call from a guy named Sam 
Dash—Chief Counsel of the Watergate Committee—a wonderful man.” 
Dash was having trouble finding investigators and he offered Woodward a 
job, and Woodward said—in those days it was true—you  couldn’t  go  back  
and forth between the press and government.  So Dash said, “Who should I 
get?”    Woodward said, “We should get someone that would be a good 
journalist,   but  wasn’t.      Someone  who   is   not   an   academic,   but   a   practical  
investigator.”    He  recommended me, and said that I would get a call from 
Dash.  Dash called and offered me a job. 
John Dean: Alex, one day you got a request from Larry Higby to 
install the taping system.  Can you lay that fundamental fact out there for 
the audience? 
Alex Butterfield: Larry Higby was Bob Haldeman’s   staff   assistant.    
Bob had three staff assistants.  We called them the Beaver Patrol.  They 
were all young—twenty-three, twenty-four years old—and Larry was the 
main   guy,   Haldeman’s   closest   staff   assistant.      And   everybody   wanted   a  
Higby.  If you had a Higby, you had some status there in the White House.  
But if Higby came in and said something, you knew it came from 
Haldeman.  He came into my office one day, and my office then, I had 
taken  over  Haldeman’s  office  adjoining  the  Oval  Office,  and  Haldeman had 
moved from the grand office down the hall where we had put Spiro Agnew, 
and we had to kick the Vice President out so Haldeman could take that 
office.  Nixon was the first President to put the Vice President in the West 
Wing or give him an office there.  So Higby said, “Bob  wants  me   to   tell  
you that the President wants a taping system installed in the Oval Office, 
and  he  wants  to  make  sure  it’s  a  good  taping  system,  and  he’ll  talk  to  you  
more  about  it  later.” 
John Dean: Did you know why he wanted it? 
Alex Butterfield: No,  I  didn’t  then.   That’s  all  Larry  said. 
John Dean: You understand now it was because the earlier staff’s  
system of keeping up with their reports to the President’s   file  about   their  
meetings broke down.  Do you agree with that? 
Alex Butterfield: I was not aware of that if it happened. 
John Dean: It did happen. 
Alex Butterfield: It did?  The way it was explained to me, we had a 
postal strike, and I heard the President say, “It’s  too  bad  that  when  we  had  
that postal strike, and we solved it so well—we brought people in, the 
cabinet members came in, everyone contributed to the solution—and   it’s  
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too  damn  bad  we  hadn’t  recorded all of that.”  I just assumed it was for the 
book of course that would always follow his presidency, and we had a 
system going at that very time where we had someone sitting in taking 
notes  whenever   someone  came   in   that  wasn’t   a   staff  member.     At   first   it  
was for taking notes, which intimidated the guest.  Then it was supposed to 
be just a color report, where you wrote immediately after the meeting.  
Those   were   called   “memos   for   the   President’s   file,”   and   I   kept   those  
memos.  We had that system, and I assumed at the time that the tapes 
supplanted   that  process,  but   it  didn’t.    When we put the tapes in, we still 
kept taking the memos for the President’s file.  He was big on keeping 
things for the record. 
John Dean: Where was the equipment placed? 
Alex Butterfield: Haldeman   just   said   one   thing:   “Don’t   have   the  
military   do   it.”     The  military   could   have   done   it.     There’s   the  WHCA—
White House Communications Agency—run by an army three-star general.  
Lots of military people around the White House.  Haldeman thought the 
military might screw it up, that was the intimation.  The military guys can 
be  transferred,  and  we  didn’t  want  anyone to know about this.  The Secret 
Service were the best people to go to.  The Secret Service had a technical 
security division.  I worked with them all the time.  I was the conduit with 
the Secret Service for Nixon, so I called Al Wong, who ran the division, 
and told him what the President wanted to put in, and he sort of said, “Here 
we   go   again.”      He   didn’t   say   quite   those   words,   but   the   intonation   was  
we’ve   done   this   before.     And  of   course   they   had.  So, in the President’s  
office, they put microphones on the  mantle.    I  don’t  know  how  many,  but  
up on the mantle, in the base of the lamps.  And in his office, they 
embedded six microphones on the surface of his desk, coming up from the 
bottom.  That came back to bite them because people often drank coffee at 
the President’s  desk,  especially  his  aides,  and  you’ve  got  those  coffee  cups  
rattling.    Anything  at  his  desk  really  wasn’t  picked  up  as  clearly  as  it  might  
have been. 
John Dean: In fact, when you dragged a coffee cup across the desk, it 
sounds like a train going through the Oval Office. 
Alex Butterfield: And it was voice activated. 
John Dean: Why was it voice activated? 
Alex Butterfield: They just decided—I had nothing to do with it—
they put it in and when it was in, they just told me. 
John Dean: It   wasn’t   because no one thought Nixon could hit the 
switch at the right time without being conspicuous? 
Alex Butterfield: That makes a good story, and that would be true. 
John Dean: Back to locations, the Oval Office— 
Alex Butterfield: The Oval Office, I guess the Cabinet Room at that 
time  or  was  that  a  little  later?    I’m  not  sure.    The  Cabinet Room, there was 
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a switch under the desk that called the people from the staff mess to come 
up and bring coffee, so we just put a Haldeman and a Butterfield button 
under there.  I forget whether Haldeman was to turn the tapes on, or 
whether my name was to turn the tapes on.  Nixon would never do anything 
like  that.    You  couldn’t  ask  him—he’s  not  going  to  look  for  buttons— 
John Dean: Or find them. 
Alex Butterfield: Or find them, that’s   right.      So   I   did. I was the 
Cabinet Secretary, which was another one of my additional duties, and I sat 
right behind the President just off to the right at all cabinet meetings, so 
when the President would be brought in—and they announced the 
President often, even in the White House—“Ladies and gentlemen, the 
President of  the  United  States.”    So  he  would  come  in  from  the  Oval  Office  
to the Cabinet Room.  When everyone stood, I would just reach forward 
and hit the button that turned the tapes on. 
John Dean: How about telephones? 
Alex Butterfield: They were on the office phones in the Oval Office.  
I think it was a little later we did the President’s   EOB office.  All 
Presidents have an office over in the Executive Office Building.  Big 
office, sort of a lounge room, sitting room, private library.   
John Dean: Any in the residence? 
Alex Butterfield: Yes, upstairs—correct  me  if  I’m  wrong  here  Scott,  
it’s  been  forty-one years since we put them in—over in the Lincoln Sitting 
Room where the President spent a lot of his time, on the second floor of the 
residence, there was a tape on that telephone.  All of these tapes came 
down to a—there’s   a   Secret Service sub-command post underneath the 
Cabinet Room that runs over toward the Oval Office.  Right across the hall 
from that little Secret Service command post is a little locker room where 
the   Secret   Service   guys   change   clothes   if   they   have   to.      It’s   just   a   long  
skinny room.  Inside the wall of that room, they put a metal door, and in 
there,   that’s   where   all   the   tapes were running.  Much later, we installed 
tapes in the President’s   office   in   Camp   David.      Haldeman   didn’t   know  
about that.  The President said, “Don’t  tell  Haldeman.”    I  had  no  idea  why. 
John Dean: How many people knew of the system? 
Alex Butterfield: I think about seven to begin with.  The President, 
Haldeman,  Higby,   and   I.      Later   I   had  Haldeman’s   permission   to   tell  my  
secretary.  She was a very trusted person.  She was one of five secretaries 
who were cleared to go with the President to Camp David, that sort of 
thing.  She knew only about the Cabinet Room, because she had to turn it 
on  one  day  when  I  wasn’t   there.     The  Cabinet Room also turned on from 
the telephone in my office.  There were two buttons for the Cabinet Room.  
One on my phone in my office, and one under the cabinet table. 
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John Dean: Before we turn directly to Watergate, let me ask you 
Scott: what did you do after you worked for the Senate Watergate 
Committee?  Just to round out this introduction. 
Scott Armstrong: Rather than go back to Boston and become a 
deputy commissioner of corrections, I took a job with Woodward and 
Bernstein to help them write a book called The Final Days.  That led to a 
job at the Washington Post and then later Woodward and I did a book 
called The Brethren on the Supreme Court, and I continued on as a 
journalist. 
John Dean: Let me ask you about The Final Days.  To me, it is the 
best   record,   but   it   is   of   course   undocumented,   as   is  Bob’s   style,   and   it’s  
held up remarkably well over the years, as an account with some dispute 
from the Nixon people about whether he was talking to portraits in the final 
days or not, as he roamed around the White House.  How comfortable are 
you after all these years with the reporting that was done to gather that 
material? 
Scott Armstrong: Very comfortable.  We did hundreds of in-depth 
interviews, talking to people several different times, off the record, but we 
got as many documents as we could—we basically reconstructed—it was 
much like the Watergate investigation became, after a certain point—a 
reconstruction of very detailed events so that we had multiple sources and 
multiple materials on each one. 
John Dean: I happen to think that The Brethren by Scott and Bob 
Woodward is one of the most remarkable pieces of journalism that goes 
inside the Supreme Court like no book had ever done before, or since.  I 
happened to re-read the material on U.S. v. Nixon—the tapes case—it is a 
blow-by-blow description—we’re  going  to  touch  on  it  a  little  bit  as  we  get  
toward the end of this session this morning.  And Scott worked on that, and 
it really gives some insight into how that case was resolved from the get-
go,  right  through  the  issuing  of  the  decision.    We’ll  come  back  to  how  this  
all unfolded, but Alex, tell us about your post-government career? 
Alex Butterfield: I feel like the guy that was going to the moon when 
he was asked what are you going to do, and he said, “Well,  I  plan  to  cry  a  
lot.”    I  cried  a  lot.    I  was  looking  for  a  job,  and  it  was  difficult,  because  I  
was not the most popular guy in town because of my testimony to the 
Senate.  My other testimony before the judiciary committee during the 
impeachment was behind closed doors, and I was the first of eight 
witnesses  in  June  or  July  of  1974.    I  really  didn’t  cry  a  lot,  but  I  did  lose  a  
lot of Air Force friends.  People   didn’t   seem   to   understand   or   know   the  
context.  Or if they did, then they obviously assumed that I should lie, or 
plead the Fifth. 
John Dean: We’ll  get  into  that.    Let’s  turn  to  Watergate.    Scott,  when  
did you first hear of the break-in at the Democratic headquarters?  Any 
recollection of where you were? 
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Scott Armstrong: I was in Boston.  I read it in the papers.  I followed 
the Washington Post closely because my friend Woodward was there, and 
there was this thing he was reporting on called  Watergate,   and   it   didn’t  
quite make any sense in the beginning. 
John Dean: Alex, how about you?  When did you first learn about the 
arrests at the Watergate? 
Alex Butterfield: I guess that morning, Saturday morning.  I heard 
something about it on the radio coming in, but when I got there the Secret 
Service called me.  It was quite early on Saturday morning.  The Secret 
Service or the FBI was asking me if a guy named Hunt was on our payroll 
or worked at the White House, and I looked it up—I had a book right there 
that had all of that in it—and I reported that he worked for Chuck Colson. 
John Dean: What  had  happened   is,  Howard  Hunt’s  name  had  come  
up fairly quickly, because at the scene of the arrests, where the Cuban-
Americans were staying at the Watergate hotel, the police got a subpoena 
and went in, and found that Howard Hunt had written a check for six 
dollars and change to a Maryland country club for one of the burglars to 
take back to Mexico and mail from Florida so he could get out of town 
dues paid.  It was a pretty direct clue that Hunt was somehow connected, 
and started the police on trying to find out who E. Howard Hunt was.  They 
also quickly found by subpoena—apparently there were a couple notebooks 
in the Watergate Hotel rooms where the burglars were staying and also in 
one of their cars—a   notebook   showing   the   initials   “H.H.  White House,”  
and  Hunt’s  number  at  the  White House, so this is one of the reasons Alex 
very quickly got a call.  Alex, just to follow up with you, when you heard 
about the break-in, what was your first reaction? 
Alex Butterfield: We did it.  No really, I just felt I knew for sure that 
we did it, and that the President had  to  know  about  it.    I’d  been  there  three  
and   a   half   years   by   that   time   and   that’s   the  way   things   operated.  I saw 
things—everything that happened, Nixon was the choreographer, the 
director of everything, and if he knew about it, Haldeman knew about it.  
They were the two that had to know about anything that happened, and I 
still feel that White House aides don’t  go  off  and  handle  things  willy-nilly.  
They’re  as  conscious  as  anyone,  or  more  so,  that  anything  they  do  reflects  
on   the  presidency,  so  I  don’t  think   there’s  a   lot  of  careless  stuff  going  on 
there.    I  still  feel  that  way.    Although,  since  I’ve  been  here talking to Scott 
and John, who are far more erudite about this thing, and have a far more 
thorough knowledge than I—I defer to  their  wisdom,  but  that’s  what  I  saw  
up close.  I was in and out of his office all day, sat in on a lot of 
conversations with him, and Nixon in his very funny way, ran the show. 
John Dean: Scott, how about you?  What was your first reaction 
when  it  started  to  unfold  and  you  learned  of  Woodward’s  reporting? 
Scott Armstrong: Well,   you’ve   got   to   go   back   in   time   to   what   a  
different world it was.  It was a very partisan environment, not just partisan 
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Democrat-Republican, but because of the Vietnam War.  My generation 
was trying to shut down the Vietnam War, and felt very powerful, but we 
were outsiders, and the establishment was closed.  And here were reporters, 
and eventually the Watergate Committee—I think I was the sixth person on 
the Democratic side, the majority side—there were seven Senators, four 
Democrats, three Republicans.  There was a sense of partisanship that was 
kind of twofold— Republicans, who were protecting Nixon, and 
Democrats, who for partisan reasons might want to go after him, and then 
there was us—I was twenty-seven years old at the time—Jerry Garcia and 
the Grateful Dead were my notion of how I should dress for work, which 
was a lot different than either the White House or the Senate at that time.  
So there was a skepticism, and I remember on my first day of work, I 
interviewed Haldeman and Ehrlichman, who had just resigned, and they 
went back and reported to the White House that they had been interviewed 
by  a  group  including  a  “White  Panther,”  who  had  actually  been  allowed  to  
ask them questions.  They thought that was quite bizarre.  Within a day or 
so, I realized how deeply divided things were at the Committee because 
John had just come in and was beginning to tell the majority staff—
Democrats—what was really going on.  John was providing a roadmap to 
it, and we were—at least my position was—we were skeptical, we had to 
find out what was really going on.  John reported that Howard Baker, who 
was the Senator that was the minority Co-Chair of the Committee, had 
backchannels to the White House, and had conversations with John and 
other people.  This was quite astounding, the notion that we were running a 
committee, and yet there was this backchannel to the White House.  Baker 
stopped having meetings, because he knew that John had now reported this 
to the majority staff.  We weren’t  telling  the  minority  staff  what  was  going  
on, because of the fear of them undercutting John, or doing something to 
cover up further.  The question was—we were having executive sessions 
where there was some exchange between the majority and the minority, 
and that information was getting back to the White House—so they 
assumed that it was somebody close to Baker.  His staff director—a fellow 
named Fred Thompson, later to become a senator, and now a spokesman 
for reverse mortgages on late night T.V.—Thompson was too busy.  We 
couldn’t   figure  out  how  he  could  do   it—we kind of monitored his phone 
calls frankly to make sure.  The assumption was it might be Jim Johnson—
I  think   that’s  his  name—Baker’s  administrative  assistant.     So   I  came  into  
the office one day, and Dash said, “We’ve   got   to   figure   out   if   he’s   the  
source.      Can   you   help   us?”      We   had   an   executive session.  I followed 
Johnson.  He jumped into a cab, I jumped into a cab—just like the 
movies—and he got out at the old Executive Office Building—the portion 
of the White House where most of the staff worked, and went in the side 
doors, the staff entrance.  So I went back and reported this and he said, 
“Well,  we  still  don’t  know  who  he’s  reporting  to,”  and  I  said, “Well, give 
me  a  second.”    I  went  over  to  the  phone  and  called  up  the  staff  counsel  we  
thought he might be working with—I think it was Buzhardt’s  office—Fred 
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Buzhardt had come over from the Pentagon.  He was kind of their go-to 
guy for these sinister and mysterious things—so I call up Mr. Buzhardt’s  
office and I said, “Can  I  speak  to  Mr.  Johnson?    I  need  to  speak  to  him.”    
And so they brought him to the phone, and he was quite surprised to hear 
me, saying, “Why  are  you  calling  me?”    I  said, “Just  to  prove  you’re  there.”    
He resigned that night because it was considered to be such a breach of 
trust that he had immediately left an executive session—a very private 
meeting at the Senate—and then went over to report to the White House.  
That was it, he was done.  So that was the kind of atmosphere in which we 
were working.  The majority staff was working with John—we were testing 
his ideas—he was still the evil John Dean who had worked for Mitchell and 
had been responsible for the cover-up, and we were trying to understand 
and follow the details that he gave, and trying to establish them 
independently,  and  we  weren’t  doing  a  very  good  job  up  through the time 
that John testified.  Just before he testified, Nixon said, “You have to stop 
the   committee   hearings,”   because   Leonid   Brezhnev, the Premier of the 
Soviet Union, was coming to the United States—a big détente meeting—
and  we  couldn’t  have  Watergate  going on during that period.  This gave us 
a little bit of a reprieve, a little respite.  So just before that we began saying, 
“This   is   not   the  way   to   investigate,”   and   I’m  serious  when   I   say   that   the  
law, the criminal process in particular, but even the law when applied to the 
Senate context—you   can’t   just   go   around  questioning   people   under   oath.    
You have to go work around the edges.  One of the things that we found 
out was that there were all these invisible people in the White House, and 
these invisible people were to some extent the lower-level staff, but 
particularly   women.      We   didn’t   have   any   women   professional   staff  
members at the time.  The White House  didn’t  have  very  many.    It  was  the  
secretarial staff.  It was an invisible world.  And here we would be, going 
into the White House, and get nothing from these senior staff members.  
But if you talked to their secretaries, and they felt comfortable, if they 
weren’t   represented   by   someone   from   the  White House staff—including, 
remarkably—John’s   secretary, who was an extremely forthright person, 
and  gave  us  enormous  help,  and  that’s  where  we  began  to  realize  that  we  
could reconstruct things.  There was a day I remember going to the Monaco 
Restaurant, right near Capitol Hill.  They have paper tablecloths over the 
regular white tablecloths, and we sat there, and I made an organization 
chart of the White House.  The question was: here’s  Nixon  [indicating  the  
top  of   the   chart]   and  here’s  Dean   [indicating  below  Nixon].     We  already  
knew   from   John’s   testimony that John   didn’t   have   notes   other   than   the  
material that he gave us, which was very limited on the subject of his 
meetings with the President.      So   there   wasn’t   going   to   be   paper  
documentation.  So we had to figure out who else would know, so we made 
a satellite chart of all the people that were in touch with Nixon, and all the 
people that were in touch with Dean.  And in the middle of this, there was 
this guy that controlled everything that came in and out of the President’s  
office—named Alexander Butterfield—and lots of other people.  We began 
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going down that list, particularly talking to their secretaries.  So that was 
the process that we were using to reconstruct things. 
John Dean: Amongst the development of the satellite chart, I wonder 
if you ever had occasion to go over to the DNC and actually visit those 
facilities where the arrest occurred? 
Scott Armstrong: We   did,   but   we   didn’t   have—again, it was all 
under these odd circumstances.  The Democratic staff going over to see the 
Democratic National Committee . . . .  We were not really investigating as 
much as we were just looking at the scenery—although we were skeptical. 
John Dean: Were you able to fill in your satellite chart as to who was 
there that you might want to reach? 
Scott Armstrong: Yes. 
John Dean: Did you ever find the fact that I hired one of the first 
female attorneys in the White House? 
Scott Armstrong: I had forgotten that part.  We were looking for 
people that were knowledgeable of the interactions that John was having 
with the President. 
John Dean: I just wanted to share that.  Let’s proceed along.  You 
developed the satellite chart.  You noticed some people you had not talked 
to . . . some you had started to talk to.  Tell us how you reached Alex 
Butterfield. 
Scott Armstrong: Well, what happened was Butterfield was on a list 
of  people,  and  we  were  going  through  it.    You’ve  got  to  look  at  the  Senate  
side.  We had no women in the professional staff.  We had a lot of women 
around—they were stenographers and secretaries, and what not—but they 
were just as bright.  I was one of those people, because I was from the Jerry 
Garcia era, who understood that women were human beings, and I liked to 
spend time with them.  They were just as intellectually vibrant and 
perceptive.  And because they were invisible, people said things all the 
time   in   those  days,  and  didn’t   think   there  was  anyone else in the room if 
there were just women there.  The same thing was true of our staff, and I 
treated these women with respect,   and   one   day,   about   eleven   o’clock   at  
night, I was working late.  This staff was very dedicated, and they worked 
around the clock.  This woman came by—we were in a converted 
auditorium and we had open work areas, little cubicles—and she said, “I’m  
about to put a memo that you would like to see on the desk of the deputy 
Republican  staff  member.”      I  wouldn’t  go   into  his   cubicle   as  a  matter  of  
principle, but she said, “I   will   lay   it   out,”   and   I   went   there   and   read   it  
leaning over, and it was this remarkable account that was being given to 
Fred Thompson—the minority staff director—from Fred Buzhardt, who 
was inside the White House, who was their go-to man to continue the 
cover-up, if you will, and Buzhardt was telling Thompson what to ask 
Dean about his meetings.  So I saw this and said, “Wow,”  and  went  to Sam 
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Dash—the majority Democratic staff director—and  said  we’ve  got  to  get  a  
copy of this, and he arranged quietly to get a copy of this.  There was an 
extraordinary amount of detail.  Very much what John had told us, but 
always with a little twist at the end, in which it was John that was covering 
up, and the questions were all oriented that way.  By this point John had 
testified—when  I’m  seeing  this  memo  for  the  first  time—and I said, “This 
is  why   the  Republican  questions  were  so  pointed.”     This  was  not  a sharp 
staff—these were not the sharpest knives in the drawer.  They were spoons, 
if anything.  But they were asking pretty pointed and direct questions of 
John, and this is where they came from.  And I thought, “Wow, this is 
really interesting,” so in one of the first interviews on this satellite chart, 
was this former Air Force colonel who had left the White House and went 
over to the FAA.  So I called up and said, “We would like to talk to you 
about procedures and whatnot about how things are run at the White 
House.    It  will  be  a  very  informal  interview.”    He  agreed  to  come. 
John Dean: So no idea there is a taping system.  It is a fishing 
expedition at this point? 
Scott Armstrong: It was a fishing expedition, but from my point of 
view, once I had this bizarre memo from Thompson, there were two things 
that were important to me.  One was, how was this reconstructed by the 
White House?    I  thought  it  probably  came  out  of  Nixon’s  attempt  to  come  
up with an account, but I thought that process would be interesting.  I 
wasn’t   thinking   tapes.     The  second  thing   that  was   important  to  me  was—
remember   that  Howard  Baker  had  been  embarrassed  by   John’s   testimony  
about the backchannel, and his chief of staff had to resign when that was 
discovered—so I was thinking that now Thompson was going to have to 
resign, and Baker probably was going to leave the committee.  I was very 
naïve, but that was my belief. 
John Dean: I’ve  got  to  be  frank,  and  one  of  the  reasons  I  did  ask  you  
in the pre-session before I appeared publically, I decided to let Howard 
Baker know that I knew he had a backchannel to the White House, because 
I had written the President’s  talking  papers  and  helped  facilitate  and  set  up  
the meeting.  Rather than pull the rug out from underneath him publically, I 
felt I would gently tug on it privately—which I did.  In a sense, I think it 
neutered him.  He said, “What else do you know that I should be careful 
about?”      I   knew   from  my  meetings  with  Sam  Dash   in  preparation of my 
appearance that Howard [Baker]—much to the frustration of Sam Dash—
seemed to be always taking anti-positions to my testimony in private, but as 
soon as the majority would resolve that they needed my testimony, he 
would come out and make it look like it was his position, so I tried to use 
this strategically when I did.  Tell us what happened once you got Alex in 
there? 
Scott Armstrong: It was Friday the thirteenth, which was not 
something that occurred to me at the time.  It felt like one hundred and ten 
degrees and we met in the air conditioned basement of the Dirksen office 
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building, in a little room that was maybe fifteen by twenty, that was never 
cleaned because we were afraid it would be bugged.  It had originally been 
very formal, with hearing tables and felt covers, but over the course of 
months of interviewing constantly, it was just filthy.  There were dust balls 
the size of soccer balls on the floor.  Everybody that came in with an 
attorney—the attorneys smoked cigars in those days, so there was a 
permanent cloud that never left the room and came down to where the edge 
of the door was.  In this unpleasant circumstance, Alexander Butterfield 
walks in not accompanied by counsel, which was very rare.  We start going 
through and I was methodical.  I went through what every drawer in his 
office held.  I went through every procedure.  I went through how they kept 
track of the President’s time, who took notes, how they gave him briefing 
memos, how they recorded the briefing memos, or whatnot.  It was quite 
enlightening.  For three hours—it must have bored him to death—but it 
was very useful for us.  We found out what the presidential calendar is, 
how the Secret Service monitored what he did, and when they destroyed 
those   things   or   didn’t.     And   then   at   the   end   of   it,   I   took   out   this   bizarre  
Thompson memo.  I took off the front part that indicated exactly what it 
was, and gave him the part that described the meetings between the 
President and Dean. 
John Dean: And they were set up like a transcript? 
Scott Armstrong: It was like a summary of a transcript.  Everything 
had a twist that Dean was the one responsible for whatever the evil act was 
at the end.  But none of this had been available, or came out publically.  It 
was not known.  I handed this document to Alex, and asked, “Can you 
explain, given the systems you just described, how this would be 
reconstructed?      What’s   it   from?”      We   went   through   the   President’s  
dictabelts, all the different things—I was thinking it was a document 
created by Nixon based on what they thought Dean would testify to.  It was 
very precise and detailed.  As my recollection is, Alex took it and looked at 
it—he had been very straightforward.  I asked, “Could this have come from 
the President’s   recollection   on   a   dictabelt?”      “No,   too   detailed   for   that.”    
“Could  this  have  come  from  somebody  else  being  present  at  the  meetings?”  
“No,  John  would  have  been  the  only  note  taker,” and we already knew that 
John  didn’t  have  notes.     So  we  went  on  like  this,  and  I  said, “Well where 
did  this  come  from?”    Alex  took  it  and  very  deliberately  set  it  down  in front 
of himself and said, “Well,   let   me   think   about   that   for   a   minute.”      The  
questioning went on—I finished up the questioning—Don Sanders, a very 
skilled FBI agent, very fair— 
John Dean: Before we get to Don, let me turn to Alex at this point.  
Alex, let’s  back  up  just  a  little  bit,  and  get  in  your  head  when  you  got  called  
to come up to the Senate.  What were you thinking and what were you 
anticipating? 
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Alex Butterfield: I had called Howard Baker on Sunday to see if I 
could come over and see him, only because he was a Republican and the 
Co-Chairman of the Watergate Committee. 
John Dean: This was before you were in there? 
Alex Butterfield: No. 
John Dean: Back all the way up to before you even arrived, when you 
get a call to come up and visit with the Senate. 
Alex Butterfield: Alright,  I  said  I’d  be  free  Friday  at  two o’clock,  and  
I was very conscious of the fact that I was due to go to the Soviet Union the 
following  Tuesday,  and  I’d  be  gone  for  almost  three  weeks. 
John Dean: And do what in the Soviet Union? 
Alex Butterfield: I was leading a government-industry trade group 
cutting a ribbon at a trade fair, and then the FAA was going to be 
negotiating—we hoped—with the Soviets, a contract to upgrade their air 
traffic control system. 
John Dean: At that point you were the administrator of the FAA. 
Alex Butterfield: Yes. 
John Dean: So not an unimportant trip? 
Alex Butterfield: No, not an unimportant trip.  I had been at the FAA 
for four months from when I left the White House.  So I met with these 
people, and— 
John Dean: Were you worried about the tapes coming out? 
Alex Butterfield: No, not really, but they were the only thing that 
hadn’t   come   out.      Throughout   your   testimony,   which   preceded   mine   by  
about three weeks, I thought a lot about the tapes.  I said, “There they are, I 
know  about  them.”    Only  seven— maybe eight—people knew about them.  
Four Secret Service guys, Haldemen, Higby, myself, and my secretary only 
knew partially about the tapes in the Cabinet Room.  So no, but I thought I 
would be called as I usually was, to tell people about the White House.  I 
worked right there in the office that adjoined the Oval Office.  Process 
questions—I was good for process questions.  And I thought it would be 
more of the same.  Of course I thought about the tapes, but I did not think it 
would be likely to get anything on the tapes. 
John Dean: And you had no question at that point of their 
significance? 
Alex Butterfield: Yes, those things were running all the time.  The 
only thing I remember differently from what Scott just said—I remember 
getting that piece of paper early on, shortly after  two  o’clock  in  that  four-
hour session with the staff.  Scott was the lead investigator, and I remember 
there was only one sheet of paper, and when he said, “Where might this 
have come from,”   I   looked   at   this   thing   and   it   looked   exactly   like   a  
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transcript—a   verbatim   transcript.      It   had   a   “P”   for President,   a   “D”   for  
Dean,  and   it  made  sense.      I  didn’t   follow   the  discussion,  but   I   thought   to  
myself that this had to come from the tapes . . . the  very  thing  I’m  worrying  
so much about.  So I just hemmed and hawed and said, “Gee, this looks 
very detailed, the President had great retentive powers, but this is too 
detailed  for  that.” 
John Dean: Your   mindset   at   this   point   is,   you   don’t   want   to   be  
perceived as a whistleblower, but you really understand the importance of 
this   evidence,   and   maybe   you   do   have   to   reveal   it.      You’re   really   in   a  
conflicted state at this point. 
Alex Butterfield: Absolutely.    Yes.    I’d  hate  to  be  the  one,  and  I  felt  
as if I were  a  peripheral  person  really.    I  wasn’t  that  involved  in  Watergate,  
or the cover-up.  Anyway, I said—finally—in a sort of panic, threw it back 
down, it slid out to the center of this little conference table, and said, “Let 
me think about that for a while,”   and   to  my  great   relief,   they  went  on   to  
other items, until Scott turned it over to Sanders, representing Fred 
Thompson—he was the minority deputy counsel—and he started with a 
few preliminary questions, and then said, “You had mentioned the 
dictabelt,”  and I had mentioned a dictabelt.  The President dictated things 
on the dictabelt—personal letters to family members, to a few 
contributors—and Rose Woods was the grand mogul of the dictabelt.  No 
one was supposed to touch them except Rose.  He said, “Apart from the 
dictabelt,   was   there   ever   any   other   listening   device   in   the  Oval  Office?”    
And  as  I  said  to  my  wife  at  breakfast  that  morning,  “I  guess  if  they  ask  me  
a  direct  question,  I  will  just  have  to  answer  it.”    I  knew  it  would  be  the  end  
of my career, certainly in Washington.  I just knew that.  Nixon was so set 
on this thing being an absolute secret—and it was an absolute secret for all 
that  time.    We  know  that  from  what’s  on  the  tapes.    So,  I  said, “I’m  sorry  
you asked that question.  Yes, there was, and   that’s  where   this  document  
had  to  have  come  from.”    And  then  we  spent  forty-five minutes describing 
the system.  I felt reasonably sure that they had not heard that from any 
previous  witness.    That  secret  of  Nixon’s  was  too  closely  held.    I  remember  
being more concerned about foreign dignitaries, who had been in our 
President’s   office—bugged—and the repercussions from that, than I did 
about the domestic fallout.  And I hated to be the one to do that.  I knew 
that  Haldeman  hadn’t  come  up  yet. 
John Dean: When foreign dignitaries stayed at Camp David, you 
actually removed the facilities, is that not correct? 
Alex Butterfield: Yes. 
John Dean: Alright,  let’s  go  to  what  happened,  as  soon  as  you  get  this  
information from Butterfield on Friday the thirteenth— 
Scott Armstrong: There’s   one   other   aspect—I went back later and 
looked   at   the   stenographer’s   notes,   and   this   is   what   she   had   down.    
Sander’s  asked  a  number  of  different  questions,  and  in  those  days,  we  were  
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kind of leading the investigation, and it was like being followed by a 
member from the minority staff.  They were kind of just there to make a 
showing and figure out what we were learning.  The questions jumped 
around a little, and then he asked the question, then Dean testified.  He said 
that at one point in one of the meetings, Nixon went over to the corner of 
his EOB office and lowered his voice when he was talking about the 
clemency questions, or I had the impression they might have been money 
conversations.  But at any rate, Sanders said, “Dean thought that the 
President lowered his voice, and Dean speculated that the President’s  
conversations might have been recorded.  Did Dean know what he was 
talking  about?”  and  Alex’s  answer  was  “No.    Dean  wouldn’t  have  known.    
There were very few of us that knew, but that’s  where  this  came  from,”  and  
picked up the document.  The way it affected me was, I thought he was 
answering my question, rather than Sanders’ question, until I looked at the 
transcript later.  As soon as we heard that, this little tingle went up my 
spine.  We then asked him the nature of this system, and I think Alex said, 
“I   think   you   guys   must   know”—I had the impression that he thought 
Sanders and I were working together to try and trap him—it apparently 
wasn’t  his  reaction,  but  he  then  described  in detail how it was constructed.  
I tried to imply that we knew this all along, and we just needed a little bit 
more.  Of course we had no idea.  The question then became, how do we 
get to this material quickly?  He told us who else knew about it, how it was 
organized and run. We had to get to it, at least from my point of view, 
before it was destroyed.  We had to do something to nail it down.  So, as 
we’re  walking  out  of  the  room,  Alex  said, “Now remember, I need to leave 
the country later next week for this very important meeting with the 
Russians.”    We’re  beginning  to  think  “Wait a minute.  We’re  putting  him  in  
the hands of the Russians?”  I can already see a civil air disaster if 
Brezhnev decides to do Nixon a favor.  So, I run back into the conference 
room and call upstairs to Sam Dash.  I said, “Sam,  Sam,  I  need  to  come  talk  
to  you.”    He  said, “What are you so excited about Scott?  It  can  wait.”    It  
was  either  his  wife’s  birthday  or  their  anniversary.    He  said, “Sarah  will  kill  
me  if  I’m  late,  I’ve  got  to  leave  right  now.”    So  I  blurted  out  “Sam,  Nixon  
taped  all  of  his  conversations,”  and  he  said, “Oh,  well  come  on  up!”    Even  
then, he only spent about five minutes because he was so worried.  His wife 
was a very formidable force.  He got this down, called Rufus Edmisten, 
who  was  Senator  Ervin’s  closest  aide.    I  then  began  the  process  of  trying  to  
find out who knew about the tapes.  I called Al Wong, the Secret Service 
man who by this point had gone to the Supreme Court as their chief clerk, 
so I was calling him at the Supreme Court to find out his version about it.  
He actually started to talk with us, and then he decided he should confer 
back with the Secret Service.  I was trying to track down Higby, and a 
fellow named Steve Ball, who later was a confirming source.  But to get 
this thing documented and get affidavits and get something on paper so that 
we  could  then  make  sure  it  wouldn’t  be  destroyed. 
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John Dean: As you can see from this chronology, we are at about the 
halfway point, and the entire focus of Watergate shifts with this revelation 
of the tapes. 
End Transcript 
 
